THE SYSTEM, FUNCTIONS AND COMPETENCIES OF THE SUPREME STATE AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY UNDER THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37547/Keywords:
Turkey, Constitution, Presidential System, Grand National Assembly, Supreme State Power, Separation of Powers, JudiciaryAbstract
The constitutional framework of the Republic of Turkey, particularly following the 2017 amendments to the 1982 Constitution, represents a unique blend of presidential governance with parliamentary elements. This article examines the supreme state authorities of Turkey—the President, the Grand National Assembly, and the judiciary—as outlined in the current Constitution. It analyzes their organizational structure, functions, and interrelations in light of recent political transformations. Drawing from comparative constitutional models and Turkish legal doctrine, the paper provides a legal and institutional overview of how the balance of power and governance is ensured under the reformed presidential system. The analysis also highlights the growing executive role of the President, the shifting dynamics of legislative oversight, and the independence of the judiciary. The study is relevant for understanding evolving models of state authority in transitional democracies.
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