IMPROVING ORGANIZATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS OF PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT IN UZBEKISTAN: A POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE CHAMBER

Abstract

This article examines the organizational and institutional mechanisms of parliamentary oversight in the Republic of Uzbekistan, with a special focus on the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis. The relevance of the topic is determined by the transition to a renewed constitutional order, the expansion of parliamentary powers and the need to transform oversight from a formal reporting procedure into an effective instrument of political accountability. The study uses normative-legal, comparative-institutional and problem-oriented methods. It analyzes the legal foundations of parliamentary control, the practical challenges of information asymmetry, weak follow-up, advisory decisions and limited analytical independence, and compares them with selected foreign practices, including the budget and audit institutions of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as the digital documentation and policy-evaluation mechanisms of Germany and France. The article argues that the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight depends not only on the existence of legal powers, but also on independent expertise, transparent procedures, inclusive participation of factions and systematic monitoring of government responses. The paper proposes a model based on a parliamentary budget analysis unit, an open oversight register, mandatory follow-up deadlines, an alternative rapporteur mechanism and stronger procedural guarantees for parliamentary investigations.