



IMPROVING ORGANIZATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS OF PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT IN UZBEKISTAN: A POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE CHAMBER

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Abstract: This article examines the organizational and institutional mechanisms of parliamentary oversight in the Republic of Uzbekistan, with a special focus on the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis. The relevance of the topic is determined by the transition to a renewed constitutional order, the expansion of parliamentary powers and the need to transform oversight from a formal reporting procedure into an effective instrument of political accountability. The study uses normative-legal, comparative-institutional and problem-oriented methods. It analyzes the legal foundations of parliamentary control, the practical challenges of information asymmetry, weak follow-up, advisory decisions and limited analytical independence, and compares them with selected foreign practices, including the budget and audit institutions of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as the digital documentation and policy-evaluation mechanisms of Germany and France. The article argues that the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight depends not only on the existence of legal powers, but also on independent expertise, transparent procedures, inclusive participation of factions and systematic monitoring of government responses. The paper proposes a model based on a parliamentary budget analysis unit, an open oversight register, mandatory follow-up deadlines, an alternative rapporteur mechanism and stronger procedural guarantees for parliamentary investigations.

Keywords: parliamentary oversight; Legislative Chamber; political accountability; information asymmetry; budget scrutiny; committee hearings; opposition rights; e-parliament; Uzbekistan; checks and balances

Introduction. Parliamentary oversight is one of the core mechanisms through which the principle of separation of powers becomes operational in democratic governance. It enables the legislature to scrutinize executive action, evaluate public policy, protect the public interest and transform political representation into practical accountability. In modern political systems, the question is no longer limited to whether a parliament has formal powers of control. The decisive issue is whether these powers are supported by institutions, procedures, information resources and political incentives that can compel the executive branch to respond to parliamentary findings.

In Uzbekistan, this issue has acquired particular importance in the context of constitutional renewal and the development of a more active parliament. The updated constitutional framework strengthened the role of the Legislative Chamber in budget control, hearing government reports, submitting parliamentary inquiries and using other forms of parliamentary control. The first parliamentary elections held under the renewed Constitution and the introduction of a mixed electoral system also created new conditions for party competition, factional responsibility and public representation. Therefore, parliamentary

oversight should be understood not only as a legal procedure, but also as a political-institutional mechanism that links citizens, deputies, committees, factions and the executive branch.

At the same time, the practice of parliamentary oversight still faces several systemic challenges. Parliamentary inquiries, government hours, committee hearings and budget discussions may lose their political significance when they are reduced to formal reporting. In many cases, deputies depend mainly on reports, figures and explanations prepared by the very executive bodies they are supposed to monitor. This creates information asymmetry and limits the objectivity of parliamentary control. Another problem is the advisory nature of many oversight decisions. If a parliamentary conclusion does not define precise tasks, deadlines, responsible officials and follow-up procedures, it may not produce real administrative or political consequences.

The purpose of this article is to develop scientifically grounded proposals for improving the organizational and institutional mechanisms of parliamentary oversight in Uzbekistan. The central research question is: what institutional conditions are necessary for transforming parliamentary oversight in the Legislative Chamber from a mainly procedural activity into a result-oriented mechanism of political accountability?

Methodology. The article is based on a qualitative research design. First, the normative-legal method is used to analyze the constitutional and legislative foundations of parliamentary oversight in Uzbekistan, including the powers of the Legislative Chamber, the Law on Parliamentary Control and parliamentary procedures related to inquiries, hearings, government reports and budget scrutiny. Secondly, a comparative-institutional method is applied to identify relevant lessons from selected parliamentary systems. The United Kingdom is examined in terms of committee autonomy, the Public Accounts Committee and the Scrutiny Unit; the United States in terms of the Congressional Budget Office and Government Accountability Office; Canada in terms of the Parliamentary Budget Officer; Germany in terms of written questions and digital documentation; and France in terms of policy evaluation and inquiry commissions.

Thirdly, the research applies a problem-oriented approach. It does not mechanically transfer foreign models to Uzbekistan, but evaluates which institutional elements can be adapted to the national constitutional order, party system and administrative practice. The analysis focuses on five criteria: autonomy of the oversight agenda, independence of information, inclusiveness of factions and experts, continuity of follow-up, and publicity of results.

Results and discussion. The first result of the research is that parliamentary oversight must be interpreted as a complete institutional cycle rather than as a single event. A hearing, inquiry or committee meeting has limited value if it is not connected with preparation, evidence collection, public discussion, decision-making, government response and subsequent monitoring. In this regard, the Legislative Chamber needs procedures that make every oversight action traceable from the initial question to the final result. Such a cycle would reduce the risk that parliamentary control becomes only a statistical indicator of the number of meetings or inquiries.

The second result concerns information asymmetry. Executive bodies usually possess more administrative data, technical expertise and internal information than parliament. If deputies receive information only from the controlled body, parliamentary oversight cannot be

fully independent. Comparative practice shows that strong parliaments create independent analytical resources. The Congressional Budget Office in the United States provides objective and non-partisan budget and economic analysis without making political recommendations. The Government Accountability Office examines government programs, spending and performance as an independent congressional watchdog. The Canadian Parliamentary Budget Officer provides independent economic and financial analysis to the Senate and House of Commons and estimates the cost of proposals when requested. These institutions demonstrate that effective oversight requires not only political will, but also professional evidence.

For Uzbekistan, this means that the Legislative Chamber should strengthen its own analytical infrastructure. A specialized Parliamentary Budget Analysis and Scrutiny Unit could be created on the basis of the existing administrative capacity of the chamber. Its mandate should include alternative examination of the execution of the State Budget, fiscal assessment of government bills, analysis of state programs and preparation of brief, critical and evidence-based notes before hearings. Such a unit should serve all committees and factions according to equal methodological standards. It should not replace political decision-making, but should provide deputies with verified information so that political conclusions are based on independent evidence.

The third result is that parliamentary oversight should become more inclusive. In a mixed electoral system, the role of political parties and factions naturally increases. However, oversight will be more credible if majority and minority positions can be expressed through clear procedural channels. Foreign experience demonstrates the importance of opposition rights in accountability mechanisms. For example, the chairing of key audit-related committees by opposition representatives in Westminster-type systems helps prevent the oversight agenda from being monopolized by the majority. In Uzbekistan, the institution of an alternative rapporteur could be introduced into the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Chamber. This mechanism would allow a faction that disagrees with the official committee report to present a reasoned alternative assessment during government hearings or budget discussions. It would not create confrontation for its own sake; rather, it would institutionalize political pluralism and improve the quality of debate.

The fourth result concerns the legal force and follow-up of parliamentary decisions. Many oversight documents lose effectiveness when they use general phrases such as “to recommend” or “to take into consideration” without defining concrete measures. Parliamentary oversight becomes politically meaningful only when its conclusions are followed by an official government response, implementation deadlines and renewed scrutiny. The practice of select committees in the United Kingdom demonstrates the importance of government responses and follow-up, while the French model shows that modern parliaments should evaluate not only legal compliance, but also the effectiveness of public policy. Therefore, oversight decisions of the Legislative Chamber should include specific tasks, deadlines, responsible officials and reporting requirements. If an official fails to provide a timely or truthful response to a parliamentary inquiry, legal and administrative responsibility should be clearly defined.

The fifth result is the need for digital transparency. Public accountability is strengthened when citizens, mass media, experts and civil society can see which questions were asked, which body responded, what deadline was established and whether the decision was implemented. Germany's digital parliamentary documentation system shows that electronic traceability is

not merely a technical convenience; it is an institutional guarantee of continuity. For Uzbekistan, an Open Parliamentary Oversight Register could be launched on the official website of the Legislative Chamber. The register should publish the text of parliamentary inquiries, deadlines, official replies, committee conclusions and information on implementation. Such a platform would reduce bureaucratic delay, increase reputational costs for non-compliance and connect parliamentary oversight with public oversight.

The sixth result relates to parliamentary investigation. This is one of the strongest forms of oversight, but it cannot be effective if procedural rules are vague. The right to request documents, invite officials, hear experts, protect witnesses, publish findings and monitor implementation should be regulated in detail. Parliamentary investigation should be used selectively, mainly for cases involving systemic administrative failure, large public expenditures, implementation of major state programs or issues of high public concern. In this way, it would not duplicate ordinary committee work, but would function as an extraordinary instrument of democratic accountability.

Table 1. Institutional directions for improving parliamentary oversight in Uzbekistan

Problem	Comparative reference	Proposed mechanism for Uzbekistan	Expected institutional effect
Information asymmetry between parliament and executive bodies	CBO, GAO, PBO, NAO	Parliamentary Budget Analysis and Scrutiny Unit; strengthened research service	Independent evidence, better hearings and higher-quality budget control
Formal and advisory oversight decisions	UK committee follow-up; French policy evaluation	Mandatory government response, clear deadlines and named responsible officials	Continuity between hearing, decision, response and monitoring
Limited factional pluralism in oversight debates	Opposition guarantees in Westminster practice	Alternative rapporteur mechanism for factions	Institutionalized political competition and more balanced discussion
Low transparency of inquiries and replies	German digital documentation practice	Open Parliamentary Oversight Register	Public monitoring, reduced delays and higher reputational accountability
Underdeveloped parliamentary investigation procedure	US hearings and French inquiry commissions	Detailed rules on documents, witnesses, experts and publication of findings	A stronger extraordinary mechanism for systemic problems

Conclusion



The development of parliamentary oversight in Uzbekistan should be viewed as an important stage in strengthening democratic governance, political accountability and the practical balance of powers. The analysis shows that the effectiveness of the Legislative Chamber depends not only on formal constitutional authority, but also on the institutional capacity to obtain independent information, organize inclusive debate, adopt enforceable decisions and monitor implementation.

The proposed reforms are interrelated. A budget analysis and scrutiny unit would reduce information asymmetry. An alternative rapporteur mechanism would strengthen factional participation. Mandatory follow-up rules would give oversight decisions practical force. An open digital register would transform parliamentary oversight into a public process. Clear procedures for parliamentary investigation would provide a strong instrument for addressing systemic failures.

Thus, the future model of parliamentary oversight in Uzbekistan should move from episodic control to a continuous accountability cycle: problem identification, independent analysis, public hearing, binding decision, government response and repeated monitoring. Such an approach would increase the authority of the Legislative Chamber, strengthen the responsibility of executive bodies and make parliamentary control a real mechanism for serving the interests of citizens.

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