



SPEECH ACTS, THEIR DIFFERENCES AND RELATIONS

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<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12664678>

Abstract: This article discusses John L. Austin's theory and classification of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. The illocutionary act, its theory, success, formulas and problems of classification are considered. The connection of the illocutionary act with other acts and the difference from them is considered, albeit partially.

Key words: speech act, locutionary act, rhetorical and phatic message, illocutionary act, performative effect, uptake, conventional, perlocutionary act.

Аннотация: В этой статье обсуждается теория Джона Л. Остина и классификация локутивных, иллокутивных и перлокутивных актов. Рассматривается иллокутивный акт, его теория, успешность, формулы и проблемы классификации. Рассматривается связь иллокутивного акта с другими актами и отличие от них, хотя и частично.

Ключевые слова: речевой акт, локутивный акт, риторико-фатическое сообщение, иллокутивный акт, перформативный эффект, усвоение, конвенциональный, перлокутивный акт.

Annotatsiya: Ushbu maqola Jon L. Ostinning lakutsion, illakutsion va perlakutsion aktlar haqidagi nazariyasi va tasnifi haqida soʻz yuritiladi. Illakutsion akt, uning nazariyasi, muvaffaqiyati, formulalari va tasniflash muammolari koʻrib chiqiladi. Illakutsion aktning boshqa aktlar bilan bogʻliqligi va ulardan farqi qisman boʻlsada koʻrib chiqiladi.

Kalit soʻzlar: nutq akti, lokutsion akt, retik va fatik xabar, illakutsion akt, performative taʼsir, uptake, konvensional, perlakutsion akt.

INTRODUCTION

When we speak, we articulate sounds with our vocal organs in such a way that they belong to a certain natural language, adhere to its rules, and convey a certain meaning. Our speech has more or less specific goals, which it may or may not achieve, and can express intentions or other mental states, leading to various (sometimes unintended) consequences, and so on. It can be said that we use language for communication, strategic purposes, expressing emotional or other psychological states, persuasion, and even joking or playing. This diverse set of activities plays a significant role when we speak or perform speech acts. These aspects have been analyzed by philosophers and linguists within the traditions of speech act theory, primarily by the English philosopher John L. Austin, who distinguished between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. We will first examine Austin's distinctions and analyses in this field¹.

MATERIALS AND METHOD

¹ Locution, illocution, perlocution Marina Sbisà published in: M. Sbisà & K. Turner (eds), *Pragmatics of Speech Actions, Handbook of Pragmatics 2*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2013

2. John L. Austin on Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts².

Locutionary act, illocutionary act, and perlocutionary act are names given to three aspects of what John L. Austin called the "total speech act situation." According to Austin, any feature of a speech act and the situation in which it occurs can relate to its meaning and the evaluation of the speech act's correctness, which, in his view, can never be compared to the logician's assessment of truth and falsity. Thus, in a certain sense, a speech act is a holistic, complex phenomenon or even, as he wrote, "a single, overarching event with which we ultimately deal in explanation."³ However, illuminating such an event involves achieving a certain level of abstraction. Austin declared his distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, noting that doing something is an ambiguous expression that can involve "doing something to say something" or "doing something in saying something." This reanalysis can lead to identifying various abstract acts within the same general speech act that might fail independently in non-standard situations, leading to "various nonsensicalities" and therefore be evaluated and assessed independently⁴. At this point, the contemporary reader might observe that, according to Austin, acts should be extraordinary things. This consideration is logically correct, especially from the perspective that acts can be reduced to physical acts (let alone their connection to enabling neural events) and are subject to the materialistic constraints of any accepted person. However, this was not Austin's view. In his philosophical works, Austin reveals himself as an ontological pluralist, a philosopher who does not impose any limit on the number of ontological types or domains to which things (and even the same "thing") may belong. In his perception theory, he explicitly rejects the dichotomy between "material objects" and internal, psychological entities. Therefore, applying materialistic constraints to the concept of an act in the context of his philosophy leads to misinterpretations. Setting metaphysical questions aside, we should remember that for Austin, there are no ontological claims beyond those that arise from observing our usual way of speaking and examining the feelings that might be involved in acting in some way. When various deficiencies and evaluation criteria typically associated with speech acts are considered and reviewed, according to Austin, "abstract" acts such as locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts also become legitimate objects of our attention⁵.

RESULTS

2.1 Locutionary Act

Introduced to science by Austin in 1975, the concept of the locutionary act holds an important place in linguistics. A locutionary act involves the act of the speaker saying something through sounds and consists of three components: phonetic act, phatic act, and rhetic act.

- Phonetic Act

The phonetic act involves producing sounds. It includes the production of sounds during speech, but these sounds alone do not constitute a sentence. For example, the initial

² Locution, illocution, perlocution Marina Sbisà published in: M. Sbisà & K. Turner (eds), *Pragmatics of Speech Actions, Handbook of Pragmatics 2*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2013

³ Speech acts, An essay in, *The philosophy of Language*, John r. Searle, Austin 1975: 520

⁴ John r. Searle, (1975: 147).

⁵ Locution, illocution, perlocution Marina Sbisà published in: M. Sbisà & K. Turner (eds), *Pragmatics of Speech Actions, Handbook of Pragmatics 2*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2013

sounds produced by infants might not be words, but they are still producing sounds. In the phonetic act, various tones, volume levels, and qualities of the sounds are analyzed.

- Phatic Act

The phatic act involves producing sounds according to the rules of a language. In this act, sounds are aligned with the phonemes, morphemes, and other linguistic structures of the language. In other words, the speaker is speaking in that language through the phatic act. For example, speaking a language without fully understanding it but following its phonetic, morphemic, and linguistic rules constitutes a phatic act.

- Rhetic Act

The rhetic act involves uttering words that have grammatical meaning. This act encompasses meaning and may include "content" or "source" or both. According to Austin, the rhetic act expresses the speaker's intention. For example, saying "It's late" conveys the speaker's intention and the contextual meaning to the listener.

Examples: Austin illustrates the difference between phatic and rhetic acts with the following examples: "I told him 'It's late.'"

Phatic message: "I told him 'It's late.'"

Rhetic message: "I told him that it was late."

In this example, the locutionary act involves saying the sentence "It's late." In the phatic act, this merely involves the pronunciation of the sounds of the sentence "It's late." The rhetic act, however, involves understanding and conveying the meaning of the words. The theory aids in understanding language and conveying the meaning of sentences, providing valuable resources for ongoing and future research in linguistics and philology

2.2 Illocutionary Act

Austin introduces the illocutionary act to science as a type of act that is automatically performed when we use a locutionary act. Illocutionary acts are considered ways of "using" language, a concept discussed in ordinary language philosophy. Austin criticizes the view that locutionary meaning is the same as using language and distinguishes between various meanings of using language: one related to locutionary meaning, another to illocutionary acts, a third to achieving non-linguistic goals, and a fourth to "non-serious" or "etiolated" uses. To explain these differences more clearly, Austin prefers to use detailed terminology instead of the broad term "using language."

2.2.1 Discussing Austin's View on Joking, Quoting, and Staging

Austin argues that joking, quoting, or staging are not speech acts. Inspired by Austin's ideas, French phenomenologist Jacques Derrida challenged the vitality of speech acts, particularly illocutionary acts. Derrida argued that linguistic expressions, including performative expressions related to illocutionary acts, can be used without serious intention, leading to what he called "iterability." He considered Austin's view that such uses are "parasitic" or "non-serious" as incorrect. Derrida emphasized that there is nothing inherently serious or central in language use. However, Austin's real purpose was not to emphasize serious intentions but to critique Wittgenstein's idea of the "infinite use of language." Wittgenstein provided a list of the wide and diverse uses of language, from commands to narratives and staging. Austin stressed the need to distinguish the specific meaning of each use of language to understand speech and language.

Austin's categories of locution, illocution, perlocution, and etiolated (non-serious speech acts) are not mutually exclusive but are analytical categories that can be applied to any

speech act. For example, joking, quoting, staging, and writing literary works are types of etiolated acts, while stating, questioning, promising, ordering, and apologizing are types of illocutionary acts. A speech act can simultaneously belong to both illocutionary and etiolated categories, such as in staging, where the speech act belongs to a character rather than a real person.

2.2.2 Illocutionary Acts, Performatives, and Force

Returning to the illocutionary act, these acts are usually performed automatically when locutionary acts are performed (the term "illocutionary" derives from "in+locutionary"). Austin emphasizes that illocutionary acts are reflected in locutionary acts and explains various linguistic tools that demonstrate the performance of these acts. These tools include adding mood, sentence type, specific lexical elements, modal verbs, intonation, or punctuation to the sentence. The speaker's gestures and speech context also contribute.

The purpose of these tools is to determine how the sentence is received or its force. Austin borrows the term "force" from Frege, where Frege links the expressed thought of a sentence with the speaker's judgment of its truth or falsity. While Frege limits this to truth or falsity, Austin extends the term to apply to all illocutionary acts. From Austin's perspective, the illocutionary force of a sentence is the act performed by saying it, provided that the act is correct. This is a form of "meaning" in a broad sense but differs from the traditional meaning related to the locutionary act.

DISCUSSION

Performative Formulas

Performative formulas, such as "I promise" or "Passengers are warned...," are the clearest means of performing illocutionary acts and enhance the specificity of the illocutionary act being performed. However, illocutionary acts are sometimes performed through sentence type or modal verbs, and in this case, they are often negotiable. For example, a command with "please" can be a command, a request, or a suggestion, and how it functions depends on how it is received during the conversation.

Success of Illocutionary Acts

When using a performative formula, such as "I order you...," the sentence succeeds in giving a command or fails because it is inappropriate or incorrect, for example, if the speaker lacks the authority. Therefore, using an illocutionary force-indicating device indicates that an illocutionary act is being performed. This is evident from the fact that the statement "I order you..." functions as a correct speech act in a suitable context. However, this statement itself can function as an incorrect illocutionary act if the speaker lacks the authority to command.

Types of Illocutionary Acts

When considering the broad range of linguistic tools that convey illocutionary force, Austin introduces a classification system. This system, despite its imperfections, serves as the basis for further work by philosophers such as John R. Searle and others, and helps distinguish between different types of illocutionary acts.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this study analyzes the nature of speech acts by considering Austin's distinctions and subsequent elaborations by philosophers like Searle. It is evident that speech acts are multifaceted phenomena encompassing various dimensions of communication. Understanding the nature of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts is essential for a comprehensive grasp of linguistic communication and the different ways language is used to

perform various functions. Future research should further explore these dimensions and their applications in different languages and contexts.

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